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I. The Normative Framework 
 
1. The provisions contained in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 81 of the 
Italian Constitution, then amended through the Constitutional Law 20 April 
2012, n. 1, are fundamental in order to understand the considerations that 
will be proposed in this paper. The aforementioned constitutional rules state 
the principle of the Equilibrium of the National Budget Estimates: from 
2014 on it will be necessary “to ensure the balance between revenues and 
expenditures, taking into account the unfavorable and favorable phases of 
the cycle” (Par. 1). This principle, thus stated, refers to a period of time that 
can be (in general) more than one year: the aim is to get a balance between 
those phases of the economic cycle in which deficits can be justified and 
the other phases in which, instead, surpluses can be generated. This ap-
proach is confirmed in Par. 2 of Art. 81 currently in force: “Borrowing is 
allowed only by taking into account the effects of the economic cycle”. 
However, a second hypothesis is contemplated in the same Par. 2; when 
exceptional events occur, the Parliament may allow borrowing, “after re-
ceiving an authorization approved by an absolute majority of its members”. 
The rules thus introduced in Par. 6 of Art. 81 are extended to all public 
bodies. It establishes that “the content of the National Budget Law, the 
basic rules and the criteria to ensure a balance between revenues and ex-
penditures in the budgets and debt sustainability of all the public admin-
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istrations are established by a law endorsed by an absolute majority of the 
members of each Chamber, in accordance with the principles defined by 
constitutional law”. 
The constitutional rules here mentioned have been implemented and fur-
ther developed in the Law of 24 December 2012, n. 243, which defines 
some of the notions contained in it: 
– “Public Administrations” are the Entities identified, in line with the Eu-
ropean trend, by the accounting and public finance laws which refer to 
the list issued by ISTAT; 
– “Consolidated Accounts” are the statement of profit and loss of Public 
Administrations, written in accordance with the procedures established 
by European regulations; 
– “Balance of the Consolidated Accounts” is the net borrowing or the net 
lending defined for the purposes of the procedure concerning the exces-
sive deficit of the European Union; 
– “Structural Balance” is the balance of the account referred to above, net 
of non-recurring or temporary measures, corrected, still in accordance 
with European standards, in order to account for the effects of the cycle. 
It is quite clear that the regulations in question, once the principles were 
stated, make reference to the rules issued by the European Union, in partic-
ular concerning the regulation of excessive deficits. 
 
 
2. The constitutional law in force (from the accounting period 2014) and 
the similar European legislation lead the debt (i.e. the change in debt) back 
to a question of countercyclical policy. This approach denies the reasons 
for the debt on the allocative plane: the constitutional rules discussed in § 1 
do not allow the national community to exercise its power to decide on net 
public savings. 
In our opinion, the approach proposed by James Buchanan in 1958 is 
still worthwhile1: on the one hand, there is the community of taxpayers and, 
on the other hand, those who put their savings in the market. According to 
this approach, as Buchanan stated, the public debt is similar to a family’s 
debt, or to a local government’s debt (Municipality, Province, Region). 
In the case of local government’s debt, as in the case of household’s 
debt, the debtor bears the cost of the debt service (amortization charge plus 
interest), which is covered – mainly and, in the Italian case, in a widely 
predominant way – by its current revenues. At present, however, the State 
covers maturing bonds with new securities issues for almost the entire 
  
1 See Buchanan J.M. (1958). 
 7 
amount. This solution is certainly the most convenient, if it is feasible. This 
will be discussed extensively in the following paragraphs. 
 
 
3. On the allocative plane, it can concretely be seen that, through the 
debt, the “community of taxpayers” would postpone in time the contraction 
of resources which the financing of public spending would produce, if it 
were supported (by taxpayers) with alternative instruments, such as the tax-
es or a tariff system. 
From this point of view, there is nothing “sinful” in the debt, even if the 
Italian legislation with regards to the so-called “Fiscal federalism” contin-
ues to assign virtue labels to the richest communities and vice labels to the 
poorest ones just by taking into account the amount of their debt. On the 
side of the creditor, the postponement of consumption (savings) produces 
today less welfare (lower utility), which is offset by a price (the interest 
rate). There are those who are willing to pay this price (borrowing) in ex-
change for the benefit of the immediate use of the resources in question. As 
in all markets a state can be reached where the appraisal of those who ask is 
made compatible with those who offer. In this specific market the equilib-
rium quantity (the “indebtedness”, i.e. the variation of the debt contracted 
by the Public Administrations) is different from zero. 
On the side of the debtor (the community of taxpayers) the “reason” for 
the contract can be identified in a smaller immediate utility of future con-
sumption or in a forecast of lower future needs (for older people) or higher 
future income (for young people). The assignment of the sums borrowed 
may be relevant. However, it is also possible to assume that a person might 
borrows money and hold on the whole amount to speculate on the increase 
of the interest rate.  
In the case of local governments, the physiological destination of the 
debt, as provided by a constitutional norm (Art. 119, Par. 6, of the Italian 
Constitution), is the financing of capital expenditures. If the expenditure in 
question is equal to 100 and it is destined for the acquisition of an asset 
whose useful life is 10 years and that is not going to produce any useful result 
after ten years, financing by debt would put the load of its relevant burden on 
each “generation” of citizens, according to the rule of “pay as you go”.  
This implies that future generations will have to face the payment of the 
interest due and a part (on average, in the example above, 10%) of the bor-
rowed principal. This is what happens, in Italy, in the case of Municipali-
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ties2. Instead, as we reported, in the case of the State a total volume of debt 
builds up, that is converted at the foreseen maturity and increased by new 
debt – which is produced by the creation of a deficit – and that is not sub-
ject to amortization by resources taken from the current budget. 
 
 
4. Among the current European rules which have been accepted and 
turned into law by the Italian Republic there is a second important compo-
nent, which is “the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union” (the so-called “Fiscal Compact”), which is 
expected to become effective in 2014. These rules, actually, integrate and 
apply an already existing legislation (EC Regulation n. 1467/97, as amend-
ed by EC Regulation n. 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011) and, on the inter-
pretation level, have the purpose of reducing the restrictions imposed by the 
“Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union”. 
These have been initially introduced by EC Regulation n. 3605/93 of 22 
November 1993, many times modified, which regulates the excessive defi-
cit procedure. 
The set of constraints in question – the contents of which are proposed, 
as an example, in the fourth case, which is discussed in § 11 – is now in 
force, in the sense that our Country is presently obliged to reduce the total 
amount of its debt. There is an issue regarding the ways and the times in 
which this obligation must be met and, more specifically, the reduction rate 
of the debt which will be imposed annually to our Country. 
 
 
II. The Effects of the Italian Republic Debt. 
Some Preliminary Notes 
 
5. With reference to the constraints relating to the debt, which we have 
proposed in the first Section of this article, we have attempted to evaluate the 
change rate of the resources available to the citizens of Italy (taxpayers), re-
sources which can be used both for private and public purposes. The analysis 
refers to the hypothesis that the change rate of GDP between 2013 and 2015 
appears no different from what has been recorded between 2010 and 2011. 
This paper deals with two main issues: the impact of debt and the sus-
tainability of public finances in Italy; the absolute and relative situation of 
Southern Italy’s (Mezzogiorno’s) economy. In regard to this, two main var-
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iables are relevant: the change rate of GDP in euros at current value; the 
change rate of prices. 
In this paper, “medium term” means a time interval of 3 years. A longer 
time interval would force us to deal with the issue of the relationship 
among price changes, savings and capital accumulation: we would have to 
deal with the set of issues implicitly included in the proposed scheme, and 
which are, significant (even, the most relevant). A shorter time interval, in-
stead, would force us to analyze the possible specifications of short-term 
measures that the government would decide. 
The economic variables are defined at the current prices. Paradoxically, 
if the GDP grew in nominal terms but not in real terms and if the growth 
rate was not less than the change rate of prices (consumer prices), the eco-
nomic and social system of Italy might withstand the impact of the debt. 
We are forced to recognize that a bit of inflation would be a good thing: not 
only the increase in the real GDP is lower than in the past, but the stability 
of prices has prevented a significant reduction in the real value of the debt. 
The proposed analysis is an algebraic exercise, not referred to the GDP 
or to the household income, but to the “resources”. In a completely simpli-
fied hypothesis, as shown in the simple exercise here proposed3, the value 
of the “product”, net of the amounts due by all the taxpayers to the credi-
tors, is what is available for the financing of the “other” public expenses, 
the private consumptions and the investments.  
We assumed that the system in the mean time stabilizes itself. There-
fore, we deem it useful to analyze the period 2013-2015 starting from some 
data considered structural: a (bottom) level of nominal GDP growth, which 
is that of 2011, and a relatively low level in the growth rate of consumer 
prices. This leads us, as we will be showing below, to a sort of waterline, 
which will be (probably) sustainable, but with a significant emigration rate 
of young people and a capital loss for the middle class. The risk, of course, 
is a crack and the hope is a recovery under the conditions which we have 
set out in the Conclusions Section (§ 12). 
 
 
6. We propose to show, in essence, some possible outcomes of the situa-
tion which is taking place. You could say that the information proposed by 
us in this paper does not constitute a forecast, but a prediction, a sort of 
prophecy which the authors have deduced from a very small set of data. In 
fact, we cannot show a probability scheme of the events, which gives some 
scientific license to the results of our exercise. Above all, in the evaluation 
  
3 See Pica F., Villani S. (2012). 
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of this exercise, attention must be paid to the assumptions we have made 
and which we have clearly stated. 
On the other hand, it is clear that the present situation is, technically, dis-
astrous. It is, in fact, a situation in which the parameters that describe the 
functioning of the Italian macroeconomic system are destined to change in 
the near future from a more or less stable structure to a different setting 
whose characteristics are not yet defined. If this assumption is true, the prog-
nosis concerning the effects which, in the medium term, could be produced 
by the current financial crisis should be considered with the most careful 
consideration. This is especially true with regard to the North-South division, 
or, better, the sustainability of the economic and social system of Southern 
Italy. This conclusion is all that much stronger, the more complicated and de-
tailed is the macroeconomic model from which these prognosis derives. 
In addition, some variables that today should be the focus of the analysis 
(the change in prices rate, in all its various meanings and taking into ac-
count the VAT and fuel taxation; the issue of the effects on the aggregate 
demand and the supply, of the interest rate changes on the public debt) 
should be seriously reconsidered in their implications when the economic 
situation becomes clearer. 
 
 
III. Alternative Rules for Debt Management. 
A Simple Exercise 
 
7. As we have already pointed out, the fundamental assumption, in our 
opinion, is that the match takes place between two players: the taxpayers 
who bears the burden of debt and the related interest; the creditors who 
have offered savings and expect their payback. In regard to this, it is useful 
to give some data to understand the real nature of this issue. In Table 1 the 
amount of the government debt is divided by the number of households: in 
Italy, in 2011, each Italian family has about a burden of about € 75,000, 
which is a 14% increase from 2007. The increase is, therefore, around 3.5% 
per year. If the GDP of the current prices had increased by 4% per year (1.5 
% of real increase and 2.5 % of in price changes implicit in the GDP), the 
debt/GDP ratio would be reduced. However, the overall nominal GDP 
growth, from 2007 to 2010, was 0.19%; the fiscal resources available, 
compared with the interest on the debt, decreased (by 7.6% at the aggregate 
level; by 5.2% for each family: see the rows F and G of Table 1). At the 
same time, because of the trends in interest rates, the amount of interest for 
each family fell again by 3.4% from 2007 to 2011. In 2011, the situation 
became worse, as is shown in the Table: compared to 2010, the debt grew 
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by 3.0%; the nominal GDP grew by 1,7%; the amount of taxes grew by 
0.9%; the rate of interest on the taxes paid by households and businesses in 
Italy passed from 16.0% to 17.4%. 
 
Tab. 1 – Government debt and tax revenue in Italy 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
A. Debt (billion euros) 1.602 1.667 1.764 1.843 1.897 
B. – per each family (euros) 65.978 67.635 70.824 73.560 (75.130)* 
C. Interest (billion euros) 77 81 70 70 78 
D. – per each family and per month (euros) 266 275 235 232 (257)* 
E. of which: interest paid by the Municipalities (euros) 10,0 9,9 9,3 8,5 (8,9)* 
F. Tax revenue (resources) (billion euros) 460 456 429 442 448 
G. – per each family and per month (euros) 1.560 1.541 1.435 1.465 (1.479)* 
H. Interest on taxes in % 16,8 17,8 16,4 15,9 17,4 
Source: Elaborations of the data from the Economic Bulletins of the Bank of Italy. 
* The amounts marked with an asterisk are from SVIMEZ data. 
 
In the exercise proposed in this paper, the problem is not the amount of 
interest: a family who has a part of a budget destined for public expenses 
equal to that shown in the Table (€ 1,480 per month) is not rich, but can 
pay – as indeed paid – the interests shown in the Table, and even a “reason-
able” increase in them. The problem is the debt or, better, the assumption 
that the “loss of trust” could generate, for a substantial part of the credi-
tors, a request for repayment, or the imposition of harsh conditions. The 
family shown in our exercise can cope with the burden of the interests, but 
the overall amount of the actual financial obligation is out of proportion 
compared to the annual resources available. 
 
 
8. Another hypothesis concerns the role of the public budget we have 
established as a base for our proposed “exercise”. This hypothesis is related 
to the particular notion of sustainability which we have adopted for the 
public administrations system: there is no need to repay the debt, but it is 
necessary to take into account the different types of constraints (see from § 
10 to § 13) which govern the debt change over time. This is true, except for 
the case of debt reduction obligation (Fiscal Compact). Instead, a certain 
amount of interest on the debt should be supported yearly. 
At the national level, interest expenditure produces a burden which is fi-
nanced by taxes or even by negative changes in other expenses. In either 
cases, the amount of resources which the community of taxpayers can dis-
pose is what which is reduced. We assumed (implicitly) the hypothesis, re-
ferring to the different territorial situations, that the burden in question is 
divided among the territories in proportion to GDP. We have adopted this 
solution not because it seems appropriate, but simply because we believe 
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this is what happens in practice. However, a mechanism for the progressive 
debt allocation should work. This would produce the effect of subtracting a 
greater share of wealth from the richer communities, as also it is stated in 
Art. 53, para. 2, of the Italian Constitution. 
 
 
9. The rudimentary scheme we suggest is based on the following ex-
pression: 
 
ܴ௡ ൌ ௡ܻିଵ൫1 ൅ Π
ሶ ൯ െ ݅ܦ௡ିଵ
݌௡ିଵሺ݅ ൅ ݌ሶሻ 	ሾ1ሿ 
 
The resources of which the taxpayers’ community (that is the families, 
the employees, etc.) can dispose in the period n are the resources produced 
in the period, which amount to ௡ܻ ൌ ௡ܻିଵ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯, from which must be de-
ducted the interest paid on the debt formed in the ݊ െ 1 previous periods, 
debt which for the period n produces interest equal to ݅ܦ௡ିଵ. The real value 
of the resources of which the families can thus dispose of is determined by 
applying to it, as shown in the expression [1], an appropriate price index. 
 
Glossary of the Variables Used in the Analysis 
௜ܻ ൌ ௜ܻିଵ൫1 ൅ ߎሶ ൯ ൌ the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at time i. 
ܦ௜ ൌ ܦ௜ିଵ െ Δ௜ ൌ the debt at time i. ܦ଴ ൌ ݇ ଴ܻ ൌ the debt at time 0. 
݇ ൌ ஽బ௒బ ൌ the ratio between the debt and the GDP at time 0. 
i = the interest rate on the debt, which is considered given and reflecting the ratio between 
the interest payments and the amount of the debt. 
ܴ௜ ൌ ௜ܻ െ iD௜ିଵ െ Δ௜ ൌ disposable income at time i. ሶܴ ௜ ൌ the rate of income change. 
ߎሶ ൌ the rate of GDP change. 
pi = the prices level. 
݌ሶ ൌ the rate of prices change. 
Δ௜ ൌ the amount of the debt payback (the Fiscal Compact hypothesis). ܽ ൌ the target percentage of the debt at the end of the Fiscal Compact period. 
b = the percentage of the annual curtailment of the debt. 
ߜ ൌ ݇ െ ܽ.  
ߝ ൌ the allowable percentage of the debt on the GDP. 
 
A “glossary” of terms used in this paper is proposed above. Here we just 
want to argue that the value of ߨሶ  is assumed to be constant and equal, in the 
calculation presented for each case, to the values measured at the national 
level and for the Mezzogiorno, in the year 2010/2011; this also applies to 
the rate of prices change ݌ሶ. The interest rate i is the exogenous variable. 
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The value of it depends on “trust”. The implications of this dependency are 
developed below and will be examined in our Conclusions (§). In the alge-
braic calculation, i is assumed to be equal to the ratio, relative to 2011, be-
tween the amount of interests and the amount of debt (4,1%). 
 
 
10. The assumption of zero debt 
 
The current European standards are applied to both the current and the 
capital account of public budgets. The assumption of the zero deficit, or the 
zero debt, means that, at the consolidated level, the total amount of the ex-
penses of public administrations is equal to the amount of revenues taken in 
as a whole. The possibility of substaining new debt can only occur if the 
existing debt is amortized. Therefore, the hypothesis ܦ ൌ ܦഥ is applied. In 
this case, equation [1] is to be written as follows: 
 
ܴ௜ ൌ ଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Π
ሶ ൯௜ െ ݅ܦഥ
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ௜ 	ሾ2ሿ 
 
The object of this proposed exercise regards the change rate of the vari-
ables indicated in the expression [2], from the period 0 (2013) to period 2 
(2014), applying the relationship 
 
ሶܴ ଶ ൌ ܴଶ െ ܴଵܴଵ 	ሾ3ሿ 
 
Solving expression [1] on the basis of expressions [2] and [3], as shown 
in Appendix 1, we obtain, for the third year to which this analysis is re-
ferred to, the following 
 
ሶܴ ௜ ൌ ଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Π
ሶ ൯൫Πሶ െ ݌ሶ൯ ൅ ݅ܦഥ
ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻൣ ଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ െ ݅ܦഥ൧	ሾ4ሿ 
 
Now let us hypothesized, as indicated in Section C of Appendix 1, that 
ܦ ൌ ݇ ଴ܻ. Expression [4], in this case, becomes 
 
ሶܴ ௜ ൌ ଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Π
ሶ ൯൫Πሶ െ ݌ሶ൯ ൅ ݅݇݌ሶ ଴ܻ
ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻൣ ଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ െ ݅݇ ଴ܻ൧ ൌ 	
൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯൫Πሶ െ ݌ሶ൯ ൅ ݅݇݌ሶ
ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ െ ݅݇൯ 	ሾ5ሿ 
 
The critical element is the differenceߨሶ െ ݌ሶ: if the growth rate of the 
GDP, at current values, exceeds the rate of increase in consumer prices, ex-
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pression [5] shows values greater than 0, so that the family resources grow. 
The situation described still shows a positive aspect: the increase in prices 
reduces the burden of interest (and debt). 
If we solve expression [5] for the values given in Appendix 1, we obtain 
ሶܴ ଶூ்஺ ൌ െ0,97, for Italy as a whole. ሶܴ ଶொ௓ ൌ െ1,47, for Southern Italy, excluding the islands (the mainland of 
Southern Italy). 
Generally, we say here (this consideration applies to all the cases we 
have considered) that the condition of a particular disadvantage, in the na-
tional context, of Southern Italy comes from a smaller increase in the nom-
inal GDP and from a larger increase in prices. 
These values prefigure, in the hypothesis that the debt is zero (debt is 
equal to a constant), a prognosis of stagnation in the economy of our coun-
try, which is more severe for enterprises and households of Southern Italy 
compared to the rest of Italy. In fact, it should be considered that the hy-
pothesis shown in the expression [2], compared to the current state of the 
public financial variables is demanding: this means that the current account 
deficit must be reset and the capital expenditures must be covered with rev-
enues other than from the debt. On the other hand, a situation in which cur-
rent revenues do not cover expenses, so that all public administrations bor-
row to cover the interest on the debt, is contrary to the European constraints 
and undermines the confidence of the markets. 
 
 
11. The assumption of a constant debt-to-GDP ratio 
 
Let us now consider the case in which the debt-to-GDP ratio is, or 
should be, constant over time. This hypothesis could be possible in the fu-
ture, if it is assumed that the State debt, in the current situation, is analo-
gous to that of households or local governments. In the future, the state 
should commit itself to paying interest and a suitable installment, previous-
ly determined, on the new debt. 
If the debt-GDP ratio is constant, the debt value in period 2 is deter-
mined as follows: 
 
ܦଶ
ଶܻ
ൌ ܦଵ
ଵܻ
⇒ ܦଶ ൌ ܦଵ ଶܻଵܻ 	ሾ6ሿ 
 
On the basis of assumptions similar to those considered so far, we obtain 
 
ܦଶ ൌ ݇ ଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ଶ	ሾ7ሿ 
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so that the expression [3] becomes 
 
ሶܴ ଶ ൌ
଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ଶ െ ݅݇ ଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻଶ െ
଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ െ ݅݇ ଴ܻ
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ
଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ െ ݅݇ ଴ܻ
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ
	ሾ8ሿ 
 
Solving it, we get4: 
 
ሶܴ ൌ Πሶ െ ݌ሶሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ	ሾ9ሿ 
 
If we solve the expression [9] for the values given in Appendix 1, we 
obtain: 
 
ሶܴ ଶூ்஺ ൌ െ1,05%, for Italy as a whole. ሶܴ ଶொ௓ ൌ െ1,54%, for the continental Mezzogiorno. 
 
Expression [9], of course, does not depend on the parameters݅, ݇, ܦ. 
What only matters is the comparison between the change rate in GDP and 
the change rate in consumer prices. 
In case 2, which we have proposed, the situation for Italy (and the Mez-
zogiorno) is already a declining situation: with the given resources we are 
forced to cover, even if we consider only the interest on the debt, charges 
whose amount is increasing with respect to real income. However, the 
question does not concern the debt, but the ability of the country to grow, 
which is in itself considered. Applying, in fact, the equations of our simple 
exercise to imaginary case of debt 0, we obtain: 
 
ሶܴ ଶ ൌ
଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ଶ
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻଶ െ
଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ
଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ
	ሾ10ሿ 
 
Expression [10] leads, compared to expression [8], to the same result5. 
 
  
  
4 See Appendix 1, Section C, Hypothesis II. 
5 See again Appendix 1. 
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12. The hypothesis of setting a cap on the public indebtedness 
 
If we consider the case in which the indebtedness allowed (the “deficit”) 
is, at the most, for a given percentage of GDP (which was established at 
3%, as one of the criteria set by the Maastricht Treaty for the admission of 
a country in the European Monetary Union), the resources available in the 
first and second period will be identified, respectively, by the following 
equations: 
 
ܴଵ ൌ Y଴൫1 ൅ Π
ሶ ൯ െ iD଴
p଴ሺ1 ൅ pሶ ሻ 	ሾ11ሿ 
 
ܴଶ ൌ ଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Π
ሶ ൯ଶ െ ݅ൣܦ଴ ൅ ߝ ଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯൧
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻଶ 	ሾ12ሿ 
 
Starting from these expressions, we can once again obtain the change 
rate of resources, which is equal to 
 
ሶܴ ଶ ൌ ൫1 ൅ Π
ሶ ൯൫Πሶ െ ݌ሶ൯ ൅ ݅݇݌ሶ െ ݅ߝ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯
ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ െ ݅݇൯ 	ሾ13ሿ 
 
If we solve this expression using the values given in Appendix 1, we ob-
tain: 
ሶܴ ଶூ்஺ ൌ െ	1,37%, for Italy as a whole. ሶܴ ଶொ௓ ൌ െ	1,88%, for the mainland of Southern Italy. 
Even in this third scenario, the prognosis is still a declining situation. 
The results obtained are more stringent than those shown in the first and in 
the second hypothesis. 
It should be noted in this case, as well as in the one proposed in § 11, 
the increase in prices reduces, however, the weight of the outstanding debt. 
On the other hand, in this case, the allowable variation of the debt is pro-
portional to the GDP (and not to its growth). It follows, however, an in-
crease in interests, which is destined to produce a severe (or better, a more 
severe) contraction of resources. 
 
 
13. The hypothesis of debt relief 
 
The fourth hypothesis includes the establishment of a mandatory plane 
for the reduction of the debt which leads to its contraction, each year, ac-
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counting for 5% of the differences between its amount and the amount cor-
responding to 60% of the GDP. Therefore, assuming that a is worth 0.6 and 
b 0.05, the aforementioned hypothesis may be formalized by the following 
expression: 
 
Δ௡ ൌ ܦ௡ିଵ ൬ܦ௡ିଵ௡ܻିଵ െ ܽ൰ ܾ ൌ
ܾܦ௡ିଵଶ
௡ܻିଵ
െ ܾܽܦ௡ିଵ ௡ܻିଵ
௡ܻିଵ
	ሾ14ሿ 
 
Starting from the expression [14] and given the assumptions considered 
so far, we can reckon the amount of resources available in the first and sec-
ond period: 
 
ܴଵ ൌ ଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Π
ሶ ൯ െ ݅݇ ଴ܻ െ ܾ݇ ଴ܻሺ݇ െ ܽሻ
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ pሶ ሻ ;	ሾ15ሿ 
 
ܴଶ ൌ ଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Π
ሶ ൯ଶ െ ݅ܦଵ ൅ iΔଵ െ Δଶ
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ pሶ ሻଶ 	ሾ16ሿ 
 
A complicated algebraic system follows. It is proposed in Appendix 1. 
The solution obtained is as follows: 
 
ሶܴ ଶ ൌ ܯ൫Π
ሶ െ ݌ሶ൯
ܧ ൅
ܰሺ݅ሻ
ܧ ൅
ܳሺܾሻ
ܧ 	ሾ17ሿ 
 
In the numerator, the three functions M, N and Q show the three compo-
nents that the considered phenomenon will have: M depends, as we have so 
far noted for all the cases mentioned, the difference between nominal GDP 
growth rate and growth rate of prices; N depends on the interest rate and 
still has, as in the third case, a negative sign; Q depends on the allowable 
percentage of debt reduction (5% of the difference between its previous 
level and the desired level – 60% –) which has been imposed. Significantly 
the sign Q is positive: the reduction plane, by itself, does not reduce the rate 
of resource development. In this case, what happens is already provided by 
a caveat pharmacological specially modified: quos non occidit, servat 
(“what doesn’t kill you, saves you”). 
Note that the denominator of the expression [17], namely the value E6, 
depends negatively on b: the constraint increases the level of the bet, there-
by making heavier the impact on the resources of a negative change rate in 
the real GDP ൫Πሶ െ ݌ሶ൯. 
  
6 For the meaning of the E, see again Appendix 1. 
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This leads to the following values: 
 
ሶܴ ூ்஺ ൌ െ1,13%, for the country as a whole. ሶܴொ௓ ൌ െ1,69%, for the mainland of Southern Italy. 
 
The prognosis is still a decline in Italy (and the Mezzogiorno) and this 
time, compared to other cases, even more severe. The issue, which we hope 
someone will highlight over the long term, and to which we hope someone 
can give an answer, is a breaking point, which refers to the general consid-
erations of § 6. 
 
 
14. Conclusions 
 
Let us consider, in first place, two simple facts, which we indicate be-
low by the letters A and B. 
 
A. The 2013 is not an annus horribilis (“a horrible year”), but not even 
is an annus mirabilis (“a marvelous year”). This is also true in the best of 
hypotheses. Moreover, if we assume the absence of the debt 7, the effective 
increase in resources, calculated in a similar way to the one adopted in the 
simple exercise, is equal to Πሶ െ ݌ሶ. This means that, if we use as a base the 
data of 2010 and 2011, there could be a reduction of real resources of 
1.03% for Italy and of 1.53% for the Mezzogiorno. In any case, therefore, 
we would have a problem. 
 
B. In 2011 there is a gap between total current revenues and current ex-
penditures of public administrations involving a “deficit” of the current ac-
count of 25 billion, which is added to the “deficit” of the capital account. 
The fact that the current “deficit” is also produced by the interest on the 
debt (so that there is a so-called “Primary Surplus”), amounting to 78 bil-
lion, could be considered not significant by the creditors. In the near future, 
therefore, nothing else but the deficit will matter. 
The observation sub B brings back the question of the “analogies” 
(comp. § 2): it is clear today that a State which has given up its monetary 
sovereignty is actually similar, with regard to the debt, to a local govern-
ment, or a household. Both are forced to cover, by their current revenue, a 
  
7 If the debt was equal to zero, the following values for ܴ௜, ܴ௜ିଵ, ሶܴ  would result: 
 
ܴ௜ ൌ ௒బሺଵାగሶ ሻ௣బሺଵା௣ሶሻì
௜ ; 	ܴ௜ିଵ ൌ ௒బሺଵାగሶ ሻ
೔షభ
௣బሺଵା௣ሶሻ೔షభ 	 ; 	 ሶܴ ൌ
గሶ ି௣ሶ
ሾଵା௣ሿ. 
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certain portion of the debt, including interest. If this does not happen, they 
will be exposed (or better, they will be more vulnerable) to the “trust crisis” 
until the debt is extinguished. 
This situation actually involves, as we have tried to show in Appendix 2, 
a radical difference in the emphasis from the concepts of financial theory 
concerning the cost of the public debt: the problem is not to measure the 
burden, for the current generation and the future one, making different 
choices in order to finance the expenditure, but to establish the conditions 
for our economic survival. 
Now it is necessary, in a disastrous situation (as it is defined in § 6), to 
find a new equilibrium. The cost of this process rises in terms of the debt 
sustainability, as specifically defined and adopted in this paper: the debt is 
paid by a severe fall in the rate of increase in the resources available to the 
“community of taxpayers”. This means reduced consumption, saving and 
investment, which risks to worsen in the long run and which is more seri-
ous for the people of the Mezzogiorno. Renouncing to austerity, or showing 
it, on the other hand, risks producing a serious “trust crisis”: the interest 
rate, and above all the interest rate for new initiatives (by households and 
enterprises) can grow as a result to unsustainable levels. Under these condi-
tions, it is necessary to be highly selective, using scarce resources objec-
tively: an appropriate tax reform and an efficient government spending ca-
pacity would be useful to reach this goal. Without it, the private sector is 
forced to use pro-cyclical measures, which now already contribute to ag-
gravating the crisis. 
 
Appendix 1. Actual Values Observed and Hypotheses Formulated in 
the Analysis 
 
A. Actual Values Observed for 2011 
݇ ൌ 1,201 
ܽ ൌ 0,6	 
ߜ ൌ 	݇ െ ܽ ൌ 0,601 
ܾ ൌ 0,05 
݅ ൌ 0,041 
ߝ ൌ 0,03 
ߎሶூ்஺ ൌ ൅1,7% ൌ 0,0174 
ߎሶொ௓ ൌ ൅1,3% ൌ 0,0130 ݌ሶூ்஺ ൌ ൅2,8% ൌ 0,0280 ݌ሶொ௓ ൌ ൅2,9% ൌ 0,0288 
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B. Hypotheses Formulated in the Analysis 
 
B.1. First Hypothesis:ࡰ ൌ ࡰഥ . 
 
ܴଵ ൌ ଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Π
ሶ ൯ െ ݅݇ ଴ܻ
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ 	ሾ1ሿ 
 
ܴଶ ൌ ଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Π
ሶ ൯ଶ െ ݅݇ ଴ܻ
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻଶ 	ሾ2ሿ 
 
ሶܴ ଶ ൌ
଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ଶ െ ݅݇ ଴ܻ
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻଶ െ
଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ െ ݅݇ ଴ܻ
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ
଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ െ ݅݇ ଴ܻ
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ
ൌ 
 
ൌ ௒బቂ൫ଵାஈሶ ൯
మି௜௞௒బି௒బ൫ଵାஈሶ ൯ሺଵା௣ሶሻା௜௞௒బሺଵା௣ሶሻቃ
௣బሺଵା௣ሶሻమ ∙
௣బሺଵା௣ሶሻ
௒బ൫ଵାஈሶ ൯ି௜௞௒బ ൌ  
 
ൌ ൫ଵାஈሶ ൯൫ஈሶ ି௣ሶ൯ା௜௞௣ሶሺଵା௣ሶሻ൫ଵାஈሶ ି௜௞൯ 	ሾ3ሿ  
 
Using the data collected in 2011, we can calculate – with reference to a given 
year n, for example 2013 – the aforesaid change rate of the resources in the two 
areas examined: 
ሶܴ ଶூ்஺ ൌ െ0,97,for Italy as a whole. ሶܴ ଶொ௓ ൌ െ1,47,for Southern Italy, excluding the islands (the mainland of Southern 
Italy). 
 
 
B.2. Second Hypothesis: ࡰ࢔ࢅ࢔ ൌ ࢑ഥ ⇒ ࡰ࢔ ൌ ࢑ࢅ࢔ ⇒ ࢤࡰ࢔ ൌ ࢑ࢤࢅ࢔. 
 
In this case, the change rate of income is equal to 
 
ሶܴ ଶ ൌ
଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ଶ െ ݅݇ ଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ െ ଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ ൅ ݅݇ ଴ܻሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻଶ
଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ െ ݅݇ ଴ܻ
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ
 
 
Solving this expression, we get 
ൌ ௒బ൫ଵାஈሶ ൯൫ଵାஈሶ ିଵି୮ሶ ൯ି௜௞௒బ൫ଵାஈሶ ିଵି୮ሶ ൯௣బሺଵା௣ሶሻమ ∙
௣బሺଵା௣ሶሻ
௒బ൫ଵାஈሶ ൯ି௜௞௒బ ൌ  
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ൌ ൫ଵାஈሶ ൯൫ஈሶ ି୮ሶ ൯ି௜௞൫ஈሶ ି୮ሶ ൯ሺଵା୮ሶ ሻ൫ଵାஈሶ ି௜௞൯ ൌ  
 
ൌ ൫ஈሶ ି୮ሶ ൯൫ଵାஈሶ ି௜௞൯ሺଵା୮ሶ ሻ൫ଵାஈሶ ି௜௞൯ ൌ  
 
ൌ Πሶ െ pሶ1 ൅ pሶ 	ሾ4ሿ 
 
If we solve the expression obtained for the values recorded in 2011, we obtain: 
ሶܴ ଶூ்஺ ൌ െ1,05%, with reference to Italy as a whole. ሶܴ ଶொ௓ ൌ െ1,54%, with reference to the mainland of Southern Italy. 
Expression [10], which refers to the imaginary case of debt 0, leads, compared 
to the expression [8], to the same result: 
 
ሶܴ ଶ ൌ
଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ଶ െ ଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻଶ
଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ
ൌ 
 
ൌ ௒బ൫ଵାஈሶ ൯൫ଵାஈሶ ିଵି୮ሶ ൯௣బሺଵା௣ሶሻమ ∙
௣బሺଵା௣ሶሻ
௒బ൫ଵାஈሶ ൯ ൌ  
 
ൌ Πሶ െ pሶ1 ൅ pሶ 	ሾ5ሿ 
 
 
B.3. Third Hypothesis:ࡰ࢏ ൌ ࡰ࢏ି૚ ൅ ࢿࢅ࢏ି૚. 
 
The hypothesis formulated in the paper can be proposed in the following form: 
 
Debito ≡ D௜ ൌ ܦ௜ିଵ ൅ ߝ ௜ܻିଵ 
 
Starting from this expression and following the regulations of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, we can obtain the following expressions, from which we get a clear 
indication of the resources available in the first and in the second period: 
 
ܴଵ ൌ ଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Π
ሶ ൯ െ ݅ܦ଴
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ 	ሾ6ሿ 
 
ܴଶ ൌ ଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Π
ሶ ൯ଶ െ ݅ൣܦ଴ ൅ ߝ ଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯൧
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻଶ 	ሾ7ሿ 
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Assuming that ܦ଴ ൌ ݇ ଴ܻ, we get: 
 
ܴଵ ൌ ଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Π
ሶ ൯ െ ݅݇ ଴ܻ
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ ൌ
଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ െ ݅݇൯
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ 	ሾ8ሿ 
 
ܴଶ ൌ ଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Π
ሶ ൯ଶ െ ݅݇ ଴ܻ ൅ ݅ߝ ଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻଶ 	ሾ9ሿ 
 
Starting from these expressions, we can once again get the change rate of in-
come, which is equal to 
 
ሶܴ ଶ ൌ
଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ଶ െ ݅ൣ݇ ଴ܻ െ ߝ ଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯൧
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻଶ െ
଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ െ ݅݇ ଴ܻ
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ
଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ െ ݅݇ ଴ܻ
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ
ൌ 
 
ൌ ௒బ൫ଵାஈሶ ൯
మି௒బ൫ଵାஈሶ ൯ሺଵା௣ሶሻି௜௞௒బା௜௞௒బሺଵା௣ሶሻି௜ఌ௒బ൫ଵାஈሶ ൯
௣బሺଵା௣ሶሻమ ∙
௣బሺଵା௣ሶሻ
௒బ൫ଵାஈሶ ൯ି௜௞௒బ ൌ  
 
ൌ ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯൫Πሶ െ ݌ሶ൯ ൅ ݅݇݌ሶ െ ݅ߝ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ െ ݅݇൯ 																																																																							ሾ10ሿ 
 
If we solve the expression obtained for the values recorded in 2011, we obtain: 
ሶܴ ଶூ்஺ ൌ െ1,37%, with reference to Italy as a whole. ሶܴ ଶொ௓ ൌ െ1,88%, with reference to the mainland of Southern Italy. 
 
 
B.4. Fourth Hypothesis: ࢤ࢔ ൌ ࡰ࢔ି૚ ቀࡰ࢔ష૚ࢅ࢔ష૚ െ ࢇቁ࢈ ൌ
࢈ࡰ࢔ష૚૛
ࢅ࢔ష૚ െ
ࢇ࢈ࡰ࢔ష૚ࢅ࢔ష૚
ࢅ࢔ష૚ . 
 
Starting from the expression aforementioned and following the regulations of 
the Fiscal Compact, as indicated in the glossary, we obtain 
 
Δଵ ൌ ܦ଴ ቀ஽బ௒బ െ ܽቁ ܾ. 
 
Assuming that ଴ܻ ൌ തܻ଴, ܦ଴ ൌ 1,2 ଴ܻ and ܽ ൌ 0, we obtain the following formu-
lation: 
 
Δଵ ൌ 1,2 ଴ܻ ൬1,2 ଴ܻ଴ܻ െ ܽ൰ ܾ ൌ 1,2 ଴ܻሺ1,2 െ 0,6ሻܾ ൌ 0,72ܾ ଴ܻ																																				ሾ11ሿ 
 
Considering also that ܦ௜ ൌ ܦ௜ିଵ െ Δ௜ and that ܦଵ ൌ ܦ଴ െ Δଵ ൌ 1,2 ଴ܻ െ
 23 
0,72ܾ ଴ܻ ൌ ଴ܻሺ1,2 െ 0,72ܾሻ, we can calculate the amount of the debt to be repaid 
in the second year: 
 
Δଶ ൌ ܦଵ ൬ܦଵଵܻ െ 0,6൰ ܾ ൌ ܾ ଴ܻሺ1,2 െ 0,72ܾሻ ቈ
ሺ1,2 െ 0,72ܾሻ ଴ܻ
଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ െ 0,6቉ ൌ 
 
ൌ ܾ ଴ܻሺ1,2 െ 0,72ܾሻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ ൣ1,2 െ 0,72ܾ െ 0,6൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯൧																																																					ሾ12ሿ 
 
Using the results obtained, it is possible to quantify the resources available in 
the first and in the second period: 
 
ܴଵ ൌ ଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Π
ሶ ൯ െ 1,2݅ ଴ܻ െ 0,72ܾ ଴ܻ
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ 																																																																											ሾ13ሿ 
 
ܴଶ ൌ ௒మି௜஽భି୼మ௣బሺଵା௣ሶሻమ ൌ
௒బ൫ଵାஈሶ ൯ି௜஽భି୼మ
௣బሺଵା௣ሶሻమ ൌ  
 
ൌ ௒బ൫ଵାஈሶ ൯
యି௜௒బሺଵ,ଶି଴,଻ଶ௕ሻି௕௒బቀሺଵ,ଶି଴,଻ଶ௕ሻమିሺଵ,ଶି଴,଻ଶ௕ሻ଴,଺൫ଵାஈሶ ൯ቁ
൫ଵାஈሶ ൯ሺଵା௣ሶሻమ௣బ 																																				ሾ14ሿ  
 
At this point, in order to simplify the calculation of the change rate of the in-
come, we establish that 
 
௒బ൫ଵାஈሶ ൯యି௜௒బሺଵ,ଶି଴,଻ଶ௕ሻି௕௒బቀሺଵ,ଶି଴,଻ଶ௕ሻమିሺଵ,ଶି଴,଻ଶ௕ሻ଴,଺൫ଵାஈሶ ൯ቁ
௒బ ൌ ܣ  
 
Consequently 
 
ሶܴ ଶ ൌ
଴ܻܣ
൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻଶ݌଴ െ
଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ െ 1,2݅ ଴ܻ െ 0,72ܾ ଴ܻ
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ
଴ܻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ െ 1,2݅ ଴ܻ െ 0,72ܾ ଴ܻ
݌଴ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ
ൌ 
 
ൌ ௒బ஺ି௒బ൫ଵାஈሶ ൯
మሺଵା௣ሶሻାଵ,ଶ௜௒బሺଵା௣ሶሻ൫ଵାஈሶ ൯ା଴,଻ଶ௕௒బሺଵା௣ሶሻ൫ଵାஈሶ ൯
൫ଵାஈሶ ൯ሺଵା௣ሶሻమ௣బ ∙
௣బሺଵା௣ሶሻ
௒బൣ൫ଵାஈሶ ൯ିଵ,ଶ௜ି଴,଻ଶ௕൧ ൌ  
 
ൌ ஺ି൫ଵାஈሶ ൯
మሺଵା௣ሶሻାଵ,ଶ௜ሺଵା௣ሶሻ൫ଵାஈሶ ൯ା଴,଻ଶ௕ሺଵା௣ሶሻ൫ଵାஈሶ ൯
൫ଵାஈሶ ൯ሺଵା௣ሶሻ൫ଵାஈሶ ିଵ,ଶ௜ି଴,଻ଶ௕൯ 																																																											 ሾ15ሿ  
 
Decomposing this math expression, we can identify the principal relationships 
on which is based the complicated algebraic system underlying it: 
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ሶܴ ଶ ൌ ܯ൫Πሶ ൯ ൅ ܰሺ݅ሻ ൅ ܳሺܾሻ																																																																																												ሾ16ሿ 
 
Where 
 
ܯ ൌ ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯
ଶሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ
൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ െ 1,2݅ െ 0,72ܾ൯																																																											 ሾ17ሿ 
 
ܰ ൌ 1,2݅ൣ݌ሶ൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ ൅ 1,6ܾ൧൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ െ 1,2݅ െ 0,72ܾ൯																																																											 ሾ18ሿ 
 
ܳ ൌ െܾൣሺ1,2 െ 0,72ܾሻ
ଶ െ 0,6൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ሺ2,4 െ 0,72ܾ ൅ 1,2݌ሶሻ൧
൫1 ൅ Πሶ ൯ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሶሻ൫1 ൅ Πሶ െ 1,2݅ െ 0,72ܾ൯ 																													 ሾ19ሿ 
 
Solving [16] for the values observed in 2011, we can obtain the change rate of 
income for the two areas considered: 
 
ሶܴ ூ்஺ ൌ െ1,13%, for the country as a whole; ሶܴொ௓ ൌ െ1,69%, for the Mezzogiorno. 
 
 
Appendix 2. The Notion of Public Debt Sustainability in the Economic 
Literature  
 
1. The Origins 
 
On the concepts of the burden of the public debt and its financial sustainability 
economic literature has not reached a definite and clear definition. Significant con-
tributions to the analysis of the problem of debt growth and its effects on the econ-
omy date back to classical authors such as Hume, Smith and Ricardo. This last 
economist, in particular, identified three possible meanings for the term “burden of 
the debt”, using it to indicate: 
– the real transfer of resources by the subscribers of government borrowings, ac-
cording to the “macroeconomic” definition proposed in the Principles of Politi-
cal Economy and Taxation (1817); 
– the sacrifice of utility of the taxpayer required to pay the taxes which the gov-
ernment is forced to introduce or increase in order to find financial coverage for 
the interest due to the subscribers of government bonds and to repay, on the ex-
piry of the debt, the borrowed funds, according to the “microeconomic” per-
spective illustrated by the famous British economist in the Essay on the Fund-
ing System (1820); 
– the slowing down of the capital accumulation process, according to a further 
explanation of the debt effects provided once again by Ricardo inthe Funding 
System.  
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This last meaning of the concept was proposed already by Smith in that part 
(i.e. in the book V) of The Wealth of Nations (1776) in which it is shown that the 
public debt is basically a share of the annual product of a nation which is “diverted 
away”, “reversed out” from the maintenance of productive workers, to be used for 
other purposes or to be spent and wasted in a short time, without even the hope of a 
future regeneration. Ricardo, however, has the merit of being the first who dealt 
with the issue of the limits of government debt and its sustainability. This scholar 
had in fact understood that the debt growth can lead to the phenomena of instabil-
ity8, phenomena that are activated when individuals are no longer willing “submit 
to pay for the privilege merely of living in their native country” and “the tempta-
tion to remove himself and his capital to another country, where he will be ex-
empted from such burthens, becomes at last irresistible”9.  
 
 
2. The Five Pillars of Sustainability 
 
However, the limits of the debt sustainability, beyond which the subjective re-
actions of the operators are triggered, are not predictable. For this reason, the econ-
omists have attempted to identify the “objective” conditions which produce these 
reactions and, referring to some concepts of physics (more specifically, concepts of 
mechanics and thermodynamics) and biology, have developed a more complex no-
tion of financial sustainability or “objective” of the public debt, which rested – at 
least initially – on the following five pillars:  
1) time, because the nature of the abovementioned notion is dynamic, being con-
nected to the evolution over time of a particular parameter, or a value derived 
directly from parameters, which have the function of indicator; 
2) objective limits, beyond which the subjective reactions are triggered, caused by 
an alteration of the climate of trust of economic agents, when the credibility of 
the governments in office decreases, in relation to the commitments made 
through the issuance of government securities, and the credibility of the eco-
nomic policy authorities (the so-called policy-makers), with regard to the im-
plementation of stabilisation or debt reduction policies; 
3) the assumption that the capital absorbed by the loans has been subtracted from 
the funds used for the production or intended to be used for that purpose; 
4) the comparison between the interests of the current generations and those of 
the future, in the case of the financing of the debt, who will be called to sustain 
the burden of the interest and the reimbursement, in order to allow the present 
generation to benefit from the expenses financed by it; 
5) the existence of a form of social organization (a market economy or at least a 
form of market democracy in which there is a strong complementarity between 
the political and economic system), in which the governments and the public 
  
8 See, for example, Ricardo (1821), chap. XVII, para. 6: “A country which has accumu-
lated a large debt, is placed in a most artificial situation”. 
9 Ricardo (1821), chap. XVII, para. 7. 
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institutions are usually subject to the judgment of the markets; it is obvious, in 
fact, that these will be willing to lend their resources only to those subjects who 
they consider “solvents”, i.e. endowed with the ability to use the abovemen-
tioned resources to produce other wealth, on which indirectly depends the 
probability of obtaining, in the future, the repayment of the amount lent. 
In the light of these assumptions, we can derive a first rough definition of the 
debt financial sustainability. It can be intended as the ability of a given economic 
system to keep over time, and therefore sustaining, a certain level of the debt, 
draining resources from the private sector and future generations and without los-
ing the ability to produce wealth in periods subsequent to that in which these re-
sources are spent and do not affect employment or wages of the working classes. 
As can be noted, the notion of sustainability that comes from this definition is very 
complex and is not directly measurable, because it can not be regarded as an eco-
nomic phenomenon in itself, but can be considered, at least, as an ideal point, as a 
“safety” area or as a critical threshold which should not be exceeded. On the con-
trary, situations of instability first of all financial and then also monetary, would be 
created and from which may arise, subsequently, even more harmful consequences. 
For this reason, economists have tried and are still trying to identify some indica-
tors which can tell us whether that threshold has been surpassed or not, or how 
much more we still have to go in order to reach it and, therefore, reduce the unsus-
tainability. According to Mill, “a certain and an obvious index” exists and could be 
represented by the interest rate: an increase in this parameter above the level at 
which it was before the assumption of debt is the “positive proof that the govern-
ment is a competitor for capital with the ordinary channels of productive invest-
ment, and is carrying off, not merely funds which would not, but funds which 
would, have found productive employment within the country”10. 
Starting from these studies, literature has offered and continues to offer new 
methods and indicators to define and measure the public debt financial sustainabil-
ity. These methods and indicators differ both for the time horizon considered and 
for the choice of the selected variables. 
 
 
3. The Two Main Approaches to the Study of Sustainability 
 
In general, it is correct to say that the study of sustainability has followed two 
main approaches. 
The first approach is called “traditional dynamic approach”11 and traces its ori-
gins back to a famous study by Domar (1944) on the factors which determine the 
growth of the public debt burden, defined as an increase in the tax rates which is 
necessary to establish in the long run the financing of the so-called “debt service”, 
i.e. the expenditure for the interest to be paid to the government bonds holders. Ac-
cording to this approach, the public debt can be considered sustainable only if its 
  
10 Mill (1848), book V, chap. VII, para. 4. 
11 See Bagnai (1996). 
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consistency, related to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), tends to decrease over 
time, or at least not to exceed a certain threshold, the one which indicates when the 
interest rate on government bonds exceeds the economic growth rate. Domar anal-
ysis has, therefore, shifted the focus of scholars towards a new indicator, not longer 
represented by the absolute value of the debt (see Ricardo, 1817) or by the interest 
rate (see Mill, 1848), but by the debt/product ratio. According to this approach, the 
problem of the financial sustainability of the public debt is represented in dynamic 
terms (the dynamics of the debt/GDP ratio is studied) and is identified with the as-
ymptotic stability of the aforementioned ratio around a finite and constant value 
(the so-called steady state or constant steady state). We arrive, therefore, at a very 
encouraging conclusion: even assuming that we have a public budget continuosly 
in deficit (a constant deficit with respect to GDP), it is possible to prevent that the 
debt/product ratio and the one between interest paid and GDP explodes, but this is 
possible only if the growth rate of the national economy is positive. 
Two model classes are derived from this traditional dynamic approach and they 
are distinguished by the hypothesis regarding the impact of government spending 
(funded in deficit) on the real variables: 
1) the models, in which the rates of interest and growth in real terms are inde-
pendent from the method of financing the government deficit and, therefore, 
from the path of the debt, are usually defined as the dynamic linear models with 
constant coefficients (these latter, in fact, use systems of linear differential 
equations with constant coefficients) and are based on the Ricardian assump-
tion of absence of the physical capitalcrowding out12; 
2) the models, in which the method of financing the government deficit affect the 
performance of the real variables, are based on the assumption of the private 
investments crowding out (they are defined linear dynamic models with crowd-
ing out) and differ from each other for their transmission mechanisms of fiscal 
policy, that is, for the accepted interpretations of the nature of the effects of 
public expenditure financed in deficit (deficit spending)13. 
A part of the economic literature, however, strongly criticised the traditional 
dynamic approach, arguing that in approach based on the asymptotic stability of 
the debt/GDP ratio would not allow the formulating of a single objective criterion 
to test the financial sustainability of the public debt, since the used stability condi-
tions depend on the assumptions and on the structure of the theoretical base-
model14. It was found, in particular, that: 
1) the traditional analyses of stability (in particular, those which are based on dy-
namic linear models with constant coefficients) do not lead to the identification 
of a certain critical threshold beyond which the so-called “spiral of debt” is 
  
 
12 With regard to this type of models, see Masera (1985, 1986), Rossi and Salvemini 
(1987), Spaventa (1984, 1985, 1987, 1988). 
13 Among the most popular models included in this category there are the Keynesian dy-
namic model of Tobin and Buiter (1976) and the neoclassical with overlapping generations 
of Diamond (1965). 
14 See Bagnai (1996), pp. 43-44. 
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triggered, resulting in a crisis of credibility, debt repudiation and forms of fi-
nancial repression15;  
2) the use of the debt/product ratio as an indicator of difficulties in the issuance of 
the government securities is not correct; this is allowed only when the ratio be-
tween (the aggregate demand of) wealth and the GDP stays constant over time 
and, therefore, when the economic system is set in a situation of balanced eco-
nomic growth. When we’re outside of the equilibrium path, this ratio varies 
and, therefore, no longer makes sense to refer to the debt/GDP ratio. This last 
indicator could also lead to erroneous conclusions, if it is true that very often it 
tends to move even in a “perverse” way with respect to the phenomenon which 
it should signal16; 
3) economic literature has never been able to identify an absolute level of debt/ 
GDP ratio which is considered definitely negative to the economic growth and 
the redistribution17; it was deemed, therefore, that the dynamic conditions of the 
debt financial sustainability can only be identified in relation to a predeter-
mined value, more or less arbitrarily, of the debt/product ratio18. 
For these reasons, in recent times a new approach which identifies the debt sus-
tainability with observance of the intertemporal budget constraint of the govern-
ment has been gradually diffused. This approach requires that the average present 
value (APV) of the flow of all future payments of government (excluding the inter-
est payments) does not exceed that of the flow of its future receipts (including the 
seigniorage). This condition (which is called the Solvency or Transversality Condi-
tion) is considered less stringent than the Asymptotic Stability Condition of the 
debt/GDP ratio, which is the base of the traditional dynamic approach19 and is al-
ways met if the interest rate on the debt is lower than the growth rate of the econ-
omy. This helps to prevent that the government does a Ponzi type of financing op-
erations (n.-Ponzi Game Condition, commonly indicated by the NPG acronym20), 
which would make the public debt formally analogous to a speculative bubble21. 
The approach based on the intertemporal budget constraint led to two diametri-
cally opposed definitions of the sustainability depending on whether one is willing 
  
15 See, in this regard, Jappelli (1988), Blanchard, Chouraqui et al. (1990), and also 
Buiter, Corsetti et al. (1993). 
16 For analogous affirmations, see Casarosa (1988). 
17 There are different opinions regarding this. However, the most recent economic litera-
ture has shown how the values of the debt/GDP ratio higher than 85% would produce a neg-
ative effect on the growth. See, for example, Cecchetti, Mohanty and Zampolli (2011). 
18 So Blanchard, Chouraqui et al. (1990) and, principally, Pasinetti (1998). 
19 In fact, it does not necessarily require that the debt assumes finite values in relation to 
GDP. For analogous affirmations, see Cividini, Gauls and Masera (1987) and Marano (1996). 
20 In the literature on the financial instability, the behavior of the insolvent debtor who 
subscribes to new loans to pay the interest on those already contracted is called “Ponzi fi-
nance”. For further information regarding this, see Minsky (1982), O’Connell and Zeldes 
(1988), and also Buiter and Kletzer (1994, 1998). 
21 See, regarding this, O’Connel and Zeldes (1988). 
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to assume that the economy is efficient in a dynamic sense (Wilcox’s definition)22 
or one considers irrelevant the issue whether it is efficient or not, imagining that 
the economy constantly follows intertemporal equilibrium paths23 and, therefore, 
that the NPG can be violated when this does not compromise the general economic 
equilibrium (Hamilton and Flavin’s definition)24. 
 
 
4. Sustainability Tests and Indicators 
 
As a result from the two definitions previously mentioned (see § 3) new tools 
for empirical verification of the financial sustainability of the public debt, i.e. the 
tests and the indicators, were born. 
The first ones are, basically, backward-looking tools25, used in order to deter-
mine whether the fiscal policy variables, considered individually, more or less 
meet certain statistical conditions (stationary and/or cointegration conditions) 
which ensure the sustainability. These tests, in particular, are commonly used to 
verify that the time series of the observed variables are stationary26 or to measure 
their integration degree27.  
Instead, the sustainability indicators are looking-forward tools. They use, in 
fact, current information to verify whether the current values of the economic vari-
ables analyzed are aligned with the future path of the debt. For this reason, they are 
now considered as the most appropriate tool to calculate the extent of the fiscal ad-
justment to be implemented in order to restore the sustainability conditions28. The 
  
22 It is assumed that the economy is on a path of dynamically efficient steady state and, 
therefore, that the NPG is functioning. In this case, a fiscal policy will be sustainable only if 
the paths of the debt generated by it meet the abovementioned condition. See Wilcox (1989). 
23 Within efficient economies the solvency condition is assumed to be respected. There-
fore, any deviation from the paths meeting it this condition necessarily transient. See Wilcox 
(1989), p. 294. 
24 In this case, one can say that the default is compatible with the equilibrium and, there-
fore, that NPG is not functioning. Itfollowsthatnotall fiscal policies are sustainable. Paradox-
ically, the public debt will certainly be sustainable if its observed path does not meet the 
solvency condition, while it may not be sustainable even though it meets this condition. See, 
regarding this, Hamilton and Flavin (1986). 
25 The tools abovementioned, in fact, are useful in checking whether or not the survey 
data used correspond or not to the theoretical values, which in the past would have indicated 
the debt sustainability conditions. 
26 See Hamilton and Flavin (1986) and Wilcox (1989). Similar tests were conducted re-
garding the Italian economy by Corsetti (1991) and by Baglioni and Cherubini (1993). 
27 See Trehan and Walsh (1988), Smith and Zin (1991), Hakkio and Rush (1991). In Ita-
ly this type of test was used by De Luzenberger et al. (1992) and by Baglioni and Cherubini 
(1993). 
28 Estimates of the sustainability indicators for the Italian economy are provided by 
Blanchard et al. (1990), De Luzenberger et al. (1992) and Buiter WH et al. (1993). In For-
menti (2008) it has been proposed, however, an empirical test of the sustainability of the 
Italian fiscal policy using both instruments, namely both the indicators and the tests. In order 
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most recent studies are intended, however, to identify a more structured and organ-
ic analytical approach, in order to better take into account the interdependencies 
between financial variables which influence the debt dynamics (for example, the 
possible feedback effects among the fiscal policies, the macroeconomic activity 
and the financial sector)29, the short-term liquidity risks, the country specific risks 
and finally the additional risks arising from contingent liabilities (such as those re-
lated to government guarantees or financial support to the banking sector) and/or 
from the implicit ones (such as pensions and other public expenditure items related 
to demographic trends30)31 and also from other off-balance sheet obligations of the 
governments32. 
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Abstract 
 
Public Debt and Financial Sustainability of the Italian Public Finances 
 
The analysis presented in this paper deals with two main issues: the one of debt 
sustainability, meant in the particular acceptation proposed in this article, and the 
one of the effects of debt decumulation for the various territorial communities, in 
particular for the weak areas of Italy (Mezzogiorno).  
The proposed analysis aims at showing some possible outcomes of the current 
economic crisis. Four hypotheses, concerning various kinds of constraints regulat-
ing the variation over time of the debt amount, are proposed: the zero (or constant) 
debt hypothesis, the invariance of GDP-debt ratio, the hypothesis of a ceiling on 
public debt and, lastly, the case of a programmed path of public debt reduction (the 
Fiscal Compact). 
In the best case proposed (the zero debt hypothesis), the results prefigure a 
prognosis of stagnation, which is more serious for the enterprises and the families 
of the Mezzogiorno than for the rest of Italy.  
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